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Abstract  We  adopt  a  risk-taking  capability  perspective  to  study  the  determinants  of  risk-
taking behavior.  We  introduce  the  concept  of  ‘‘risk-taking  capabilities’’----absorptive  capacity,
network  resources,  and  organizational  slacks----arguing  that  recognition  of  threat  and  risk-taking
capabilities  will  inﬂuence  risk-taking  behavior,  while  the  theoretical  debate  on  threat  recog-
nition needs  to  be  clariﬁed.  Then,  drawing  from  prospect  theory,  threat  rigidity  hypothesis,
and resource-based  views  of  ﬁrms  (RBV),  we  hypothesize  that  ﬁrms’  performance,  risk-taking
capabilities,  and  their  interaction  will  positively  correlate  with  risk-taking  behavior.  We  test  our
hypotheses  using  the  data  from  Taiwan’s  high  technology  industries.  Our  analyses  lend  support
to the  threat  rigidity  hypothesis,  and  risk-taking  capabilities  are  indeed  positively  correlated
with ﬁrms’  risk-taking  behavior  and  also  moderate  the  relationship  between  past  performance
and risk-taking  behavior.
©  2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Prospect  theory;
Threat  rigidity
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It  is  generally  agreed  that  risk-taking  is  an  inevitable  pro-
cess  for  a  ﬁrm,  but  what  drives  a  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  behavior
remains  a  tangled  issue.  Scholars  have  adopted  two  differ-hypothesis
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1 https://www.aruco.com/2015/06/actility-25m-ginkoventures-
orange-swisscom-kpn-foxconn; http://www.lightreading.com/
mobile/devices-smartphones/foxconn-plugs-into-indias-
manufacturing-dreams-/d/d-id/717023; http://udn.com/news/20  
f  organization  behavior.  One  line  of  argument  is  associ-
ted  with  prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979),
hich  argues  that  a  ﬁrm  will  behave  in  a  risk-taking  manner
hen  the  ﬁrm  is  below  a  speciﬁc  self-perceived  refer-
nce  point  (Bowman,  1980;  Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,  1988;
ingh,  1986;  Wiseman  and  Gomez-Mejia,  1998).  Further-
ore,  the  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  attitude  is  inﬂuenced  by  the
eference  point  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979),  aspiration
evel  (Cyert  and  March,  1963),  or  strategic  reference  points
Fiegenbaum  et  al.,  1996;  Shoham  and  Fiegenbaum,  2002)
hat  it  adopts.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  body  of
esearch  is  associated  with  the  threat-rigidity  hypothesis
Meschi  and  Métais,  2015;  Ocasio,  1995;  Staw  et  al.,  1981;
riana  et  al.,  2013),  which  suggests  that  organizations  will
ehave  conservatively  under  threat  conditions  (D’Aveni,
989;  Fombrun  and  Ginsberg,  1990;  Meschi  and  Métais,
015).  Staw  et  al.  (1981)  asserted  that  organizations  will
estrict  information  processing  and  constrict  control  under
dverse  environmental  condition.  These  two  theories  pre-
ict  alternative  behavior  concerning  a  ﬁrm’s  facing  threat
f  uncertainty.  Interestingly,  the  literature  reports  empirical
upport  for  each  of  these  theories  (Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,
988;  Hu  et  al.,  2011;  Meschi  and  Métais,  2015;  Palmer  et  al.,
995).
Furthermore,  proposing  the  perspective  of  strategic
eference  points  (SRP),  Shoham  and  Fiegenbaum  (2002)
dentiﬁed  that  Staw  et  al.  (1981)  and  Dutton  and  Jackson
1987)  offered  the  relationship  among  threats,  references,
nd  risks-  ‘‘.  .  . They  hypothesized  that  when  confronted
ith  threat  (above  the  SRP),  decision-makers  will  constrict
nformation  ﬂow,  become  rigid  by  applying  only  tested
epertoires,  and  engage  in  centralized  decision-making.
n  contrast,  decision-makers  facing  an  opportunity  (below
he  SRP)  will  tend  to  be  more  open  to  new  informa-
ion,  more  ﬂexible  and  more  willing  to  try  new  repertoires
nd  to  decentralize  decision-making  (p.  130)’’.  Though
RP  can  be  regarded  an  integrative  theoretical  points  of
iew  toward  prospect  theory  and  threat  rigidity  hypoth-
sis,  the  deﬁnitions  toward  threat  from  SRP  and  threat
igidity  hypothesis,  however,  differ  with  each  other.  Scho-
ars  basing  on  threat  rigidity  hypothesis  identiﬁed  threat  as
dverse  environmental  conditions  a  ﬁrm  faces  (Staw  et  al.,
981)  whereas  SRP  regards  threats  as  new  issues  (above
RP)  suggesting  a  ﬁrm  is  satisfying  with  the  present  condi-
ions.  In  this  study,  we  employ  the  deﬁnition  of  threat  from
he  argument  of  threat  rigidity  hypothesis  to  propose  our
ypotheses.
Prospect  theory,  in  its  original  meaning,  dealt  with  the
elationship  between  risk  attitude  and  the  current  posi-
ion  of  a  ﬁrm  relative  to  a  reference  point.  However,
he  threat-rigidity  hypotheses  were  based  on  the  principle
hat  organizations  were  incapable  of  dealing  with  adverse
nvironments.  Thus,  threat-rigidity  is  associated  with  uncer-
ainty  and  uncontrollability,  whereas  prospect  theory  is
ssociated  with  loss  (Ocasio,  1995).  This  drives  us  to  ques-
ion  whether  organizational  characteristics  have  a  role  in
xplaining  ‘‘what  are  threats  or  opportunities?’’  We  will
mphasize  that  a  ﬁrm’s  internal  resources  repertoire  inﬂu-
nces  a  ﬁrm’s  ability  to  identify  new  issues  as  threats  or
pportunities  and,  therefore,  impact  the  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking
ecisions.
s
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News  about  Foxconn  (TW-2317),  which  is  a  major  partner
ith  Apple  (US-APPL),  infusing  a  great  volume  of  unrelated
nvestment  in  India1 ignites  us  to  investigate  whether  a  ﬁrm
onsiders  its  risky  investment  from  the  perspective  of  its
rowth  of  performance,  risk-taking  capabilities,  or  both.
n  this  paper,  we  incorporate  into  our  analysis  the  concept
f  risk-taking  capabilities  (Chatterjee  and  Hambrick,  2011;
iller  and  Lessard,  2000) built  on  the  basis  of  a  resources-
ased  view  of  the  ﬁrm  (RBV).  Firms  are  heterogeneous
ith  regard  to  the  different  resources  they  possess,  and
his  endowment  inﬂuences  their  strategic  choices  (Rumelt,
984;  Wernerfelt,  1984;  Wilson  and  Amine,  2009).  Organiza-
ional  actions  are  inﬂuenced  by  the  ﬁrms’  interpretation  of
heir  external  environment  and  their  internal  organizational
ontext  (Chattopadhyay  et  al.,  2001).  Therefore,  this  paper
ims  to  investigate  the  determinants  of  a  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking
ehavior  by  introducing  the  perspectives  of  risk-taking  capa-
ilities.
The  present  study  tests  a  sample  from  publicly  listed
rms  in  the  electronics  industry  in  Taiwan,  and  makes
hree  principal  contributions  to  literature  and  business
ractitioners.  First,  risk-taking  capabilities  can  enhance
ecision-makers’  conﬁdence  (Chatterjee  and  Hambrick,
011)  to  make  risky  decisions.  Hence,  both  a  ﬁrm’s  past
erformance  status  and  threat  conditions  and  its  risk-taking
apabilities  should  be  taken  into  account,  as  they  and  their
nteraction  can  inﬂuence  a  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  behavior.  Sec-
nd,  the  interactive  effects  of  a  ﬁrm’s  ‘‘domain’’  (gain
r  loss)  and  risk-taking  capabilities  can  settle  the  theo-
etical  debate  between  the  prospect  theory  and  threat
igidity  hypothesis.  The  condition  of  ‘‘loss’’  and  ‘‘few  capa-
ilities’’  implies  a  status  of  ‘‘nothing  to  lose’’,  and  that
f  ‘‘gain’’  and  ‘‘more  capabilities’’  can  offer  managers’
‘conﬁdence’’.  Both  conditions  offer  consistent  argument
f  the  two  theories.  Third,  following  Fiegenbaum  et  al.’s
1996)  proposition  that  ‘‘ﬁrms  possessing  both  an  internal
nd  external  reference  point  will  outperform  ﬁrms  which  are
redominantly  internally  or  externally  focused’’  (p.  229),
rms  can  make  risky  decisions  more  reasonably  by  tak-
ng  both  internal  and  external  factors  affecting  risk-taking
ehavior.
This  study  is  composed  of  six  sections.  The  ﬁrst  addresses
he  purpose  of  the  study,  followed  by  a  review  of  theoreti-
al  underpinnings  and  development  of  the  hypotheses.  The
hird  section  addresses  the  method  used  to  analyze  data
rom  sampled  ﬁrms  in  Taiwan.  The  fourth  section  explains
he  results  from  the  empirical  tests  of  the  models  and  dis-
ussion  of  the  ﬁndings  from  the  empirical  tests,  and  the
ast  section  addresses  the  conclusion  and  the  contribution
o  research.tory/7240/1083178-%E9%B4%BB%E6%B5%B7%E6%94%BB%E5%8D%
0%E5%BA%A6-%E5%BB%BA%E6%95%B8%E6%93%9A%E4%B8%AD%E5%
F%83.
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ties  composed  of  absorptive  capacities,  network  resources,What  makes  ﬁrms  embrace  risks?  
Threats, capabilities and risk-taking behavior
Prospect  theory
Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  criticized  the  traditional
rationality  assumption  in  classic  economics  by  pointing  out
that  attitudes  toward  risk  are  subject  to  different  fram-
ing.  This  exempliﬁes  and  clariﬁes  the  assertion  that  people
are  inclined  to  risk-aversion  under  positive  conditions  and
to  risk-seeking  under  negative  ones.  These  opposite  pre-
ferences  are  termed  the  ‘‘reﬂection  effect’’  (Tversky  and
Kahneman,  1981).  Thus,  managers  facing  threats  may  be
expected  to  be  risk-seeking  and  risk-averse  when  facing
opportunity  (Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,  1988;  Wiseman  and
Gomez-Mejia,  1998).  In  March  and  Shapira’s  (1987,  p.  1409)
studies  on  managerial  attitudes  toward  risk,  they  argued
that  ‘‘managers  believe  that  fewer  risks  should,  and  would,
be  taken  when  things  are  going  well.  They  expect  riskier
choices  to  be  made  when  an  organization  is  failing.’’
Even  though  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  explored
prospect  theory  at  the  individual  level,  researchers  have
found  empirical  support  for  their  ideas  at  the  organiza-
tional  level  (Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,  1988;  Palmer  et  al.,
1995).  Chattopadhyay  et  al.  (2001)  found  a  positive  relation-
ship  between  risky  organizational  actions  and  the  threat  of
likely  losses.  Similarly,  other  researchers  have  observed  that
past  poor  performance  would  trigger  risk-taking  activities
(Bromiley,  1991;  Singh,  1986;  Wiseman  and  Bromiley,  1996;
Palmer  et  al.,  1995).  Thus,  we  propose  the  ﬁrst  hypothesis.
Hypothesis  1a  (Prospect  theory).  Firms  below  their  ref-
erence  point  (underperforming  organizations)  will  conduct
more  risk-taking  behavior.
Threat  rigidity  hypothesis
In  contrast  to  the  arguments  of  the  prospect  theory,  the
threat  rigidity  hypothesis  asserts  that  organizations  will
behave  in  a  conservative  manner  under  adverse  envi-
ronmental  conditions  (Staw  et  al.,  1981).  Under  threat
conditions,  decision-makers  are  inclined  to  restrict  informa-
tion  processing  and  constrict  control  until  they  can  identify
clearly  the  adverse  events.  Threat  also  leads  ﬁrms  to  cen-
tralize  authority  and  increase  formalization  of  procedure.
‘‘The  shift  to  a  more  rigid  structure  seems  to  be  due  to  deci-
sion  makers’  attempt  to  enhance  control  so  as  to  insure  that
organizational  members  act  in  a  concerted  way  in  meeting
a  threat  situation  (Staw  et  al.,  1981,  p.  515)’’.  Especially,
Hu  et  al.  (2011)  suggested  that  ﬁrm  will  become  rigid  and
behave  more  risk-aversely.  Firms  may  be  less  likely  to  take
risks  to  initiate  acquisitions  (Iyer  and  Miller,  2008)  and  intend
to  conduct  more  divestitures  (Shimizu,  2007).
Therefore,  according  to  threat-rigidity  hypotheses,  orga-
nizations  adopt  a  conservative  style  merely  because  they
lack  the  capability  or  information  to  identify  and  hence  deal
correctly  with  a  threat.  The  hypothesis  that  competes  with
Hypothesis  1a  is  proposed  below.
Hypothesis  1b  (Threat  rigidity  hypothesis). Firms  below
their  reference  point  (underperforming  organizations)  will
conduct  less  risk-taking  behavior.
a
b221
isk-taking  capabilities
oncerning  the  deﬁnition  of  risk,  Andretta  (2014)  indicated
 lack  of  universally  accepted  deﬁnition  of  the  principles
nd  fundamental  concepts  of  how  to  assess  risk.  However,
he  deﬁnition  provided  by  Lowrance  (1976), ‘‘Risk  is  a  mea-
ure  of  the  probability  and  severity  of  adverse  effects’’,  has
ffer  foundation  for  succeeding  research  about  risk.  Some
revious  studies  have  mentioned  the  sources  and  types  of
isk.  For  instance,  Baird  and  Thomas  (1985)  classiﬁed  risk
nto  ﬁve  categories  from  the  dimension  of  sources  of  risk,
hich  includes  external  environment,  industry,  organiza-
ion,  decision  maker,  and  problem.  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2013)
nalyzed  four  different  ways  of  communicating  risk.  Dif-
erent  types  of  risks  should  be  coped  with  different  risk
anagement  strategies  (Holzmann  and  Jørgensen,  2001).
isk-taking  capabilities  can  be  considered  as  one  of  strate-
ic  assets  to  deal  with  different  types  of  risks.  Regarding
he  risk-taking  capability,  Miller  and  Lessard  (2000,  p.  92)
rgued  that  ‘‘the  ability  to  frame  risks  and  strategies  repre-
ents  a core  competence.’’  Furthermore,  they  observed  that
his  competence  encompasses  ﬁve  layers  of  responses:  (1)
btaining  and  framing  information;  (2)  designing  a  process
ith  a  long  front  end;  (3)  building  coalitions;  (4)  allocat-
ng  risks  to  parties  best  able  to  bear  it;  and  (5)  building
ong-term  coalitions  with  affected  parties.
With  these  points  in  mind,  we  can  further  depict  the
esource  side  of  risk-taking  capabilities.  If  ﬁrms  could  com-
letely  anticipate  the  risks  embedded  in  speciﬁc  risky
ctivities,  they  should  categorize  the  risks  into  four  parts:
1)  risks  that  could  be  well  handled  within  the  organiza-
ion;  (2)  risks  that  could  be  diverted  to  others  such  as
uppliers,  customers,  and  governance;  (3)  risks  that  could
e  allocated  to  partners;  and  (4)  residual  risks.  We  argue
hat  internal  resources  create  a  base  from  which  to  gener-
te  valuable  solutions  for  the  organization.  For  example,
ee  et  al.  (2001)  found  that  internal  ﬁnancial  resources
nd  technological  capabilities  are  positively  associated  with
tart-up  performance.  Spithoven  and  Teirlinck  (2015)  iden-
iﬁed  that  absorptive  capacity  as  internal  resources  can
e  regarded  as  one  determinant  of  a  ﬁrm’s  risky  R&D
nvestment.  Even  though  internal  resources  are  critical  in
he  risk-taking  process,  external  resources  also  offer  an
pportunity  to  diversify  or  internalize  the  risks.  Exter-
al  contacts  play  an  important  role  in  the  procurement
f  complementary  resources  such  as  information,  knowl-
dge,  skills,  technology,  channels,  and  ﬁnancial  resources.
hrough  social  networks,  a  ﬁrm  can  ﬁnd  capable  partners  to
eal  with  speciﬁc  risks  that  the  ﬁrm  itself  cannot  deal  with.
It  follows  that  both  internal  resources  and  external
etworks  form  the  basis  of  risk-taking  capabilities.  We
hould  not  overlook  the  fact  that  when  unanticipated  risks
re  manifesting,  organizational  slack  as  a  kind  of  internal
esource  can  buffer  the  impact  of  turbulence  (Cyert  and
arch,  1963)  and  therefore  create  the  potential  to  take  risk.
Above,  we  can  generate  Table  1  to  decompose  risk
nto  three  types  along  with  speciﬁc  risk-taking  capabilities.
ence,  from  the  perspectives  of  RBV,  risk-taking  capabili-nd  organizational  slack,  will  inﬂuence  a  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking
ehavior.  Firms  with  higher  levels  of  risk-taking  capabilities
222  H.-F.  Tsai,  C.-J.  Luan
Table  1  Decomposition  of  risk  and  risk-taking  capabilities.
Decomposition  of
risk
The  components
of  risk-taking
capabilities
Three  dimensions
Risk  can  be  dealt
within
organization
Framing  and
strategizing  risk
Absorptive
capacity
Risk-can  be  dealt
by  capable
parties
Allocating  and
diversifying  risk
Network  resources
Residual risk Buffering  risk Organizational
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tan  better  identify  valuable  opportunities,  buffer  envi-
onmental  threats,  and  internalize  risks  than  others.  In
onsequence,  they  are  inclined  to  interpret  environmen-
al  changes  as  control-enhancing  opportunities  rather  than
ontrol-reducing  threats.  In  a  similar  manner  and  consistent
ith  the  arguments  of  the  threat-rigidity  hypothesis,  ﬁrms
ndowed  with  fewer  risk-taking  capabilities  are  prone  to
ake  risk-averse  responses  to  new  issues  because  they  are
nable  to  control  the  changes.  Thus,  it  is  important  to  rec-
gnize  that  internal  risk-taking  capabilities  may  trigger  risky
rganizational  actions.
In addition  to  a  ﬁrm’s  internal  risk-taking  capabilities,
ts  external  links  can  also  be  deployable  resources  affect-
ng  the  risk-taking  behavior.  Firms  with  higher  risk-taking
apabilities  would  have  a  higher  propensity  to  embrace  risky
pportunities  and  make  proﬁts.  In  the  following  sections,  we
ill  consider  the  premise  that  risk-taking  capabilities  consist
f  available  organizational  absorptive  capacities,  network
esources,  and  organizational  slack.
he  capabilities  of  framing  and  strategizing
isk----absorptive  capacities
bsorptive  capacities  were  ﬁrst  demonstrated  by  Cohen  and
evinthal  (1990),  who  deﬁned  absorptive  capacity  as  the
bility  to  recognize  the  value  of  new,  external  informa-
ion,  assimilate  it,  and  apply  it  to  commercial  ends.  Previous
esearchers  have  tended  to  highlight  the  role  of  absorptive
apacities  on  inter-  or  intraorganizational  learning  (Lane
nd  Lubatkin,  1998).  In  this  paper,  we  also  emphasize  the
ole  of  absorptive  capacities  in  identifying  and  optimizing
roﬁtable  opportunities.
At  the  individual  level,  absorptive  capacity  is  connected
o  a  person’s  knowledge  and  background,  which  implies
hat  the  development  of  absorptive  capacity  is  ‘‘domain-
peciﬁc’’  and  ‘‘path-dependent’’  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,
990).  Every  decision-maker  has  a  distinct  developmen-
al  path  that  shapes  his  or  her  unique  cognitive  style
or  reading  the  external  environment.  Such  unique  cogni-
ive  styles  may  contribute  to  easy  recognition  of  valuable
pportunities  by  some  people,  whereas  other  people  under-
ecognize  the  same  opportunities.  Moreover,  when  external
nformation  is  unrelated  to  an  individual’s  prior  knowledge
nd  experience,  that  person  may  have  difﬁculty  predict-
ng  the  consequences  of  strategic  choice  in  forecasting  the
uture  and  retrieving  possible  alternatives  from  memory.  In
r
i
t
rslack
 similar  manner,  organizational  absorptive  capacities  are
ccumulated  through  unique  experiences  and  evolutionary
aths  and  may  facilitate  a  ﬁrm’s  ability  to  recognize  valu-
ble  opportunities.  Tsai  (2001)  and  Spithoven  and  Teirlinck
2015)  found  that  absorptive  capacity  was  positively  corre-
ated  with  an  organizational  unit’s  innovation.  Firms  with
igh  levels  of  absorptive  capacity  are  more  likely  to  take
isks.
As  Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1990,  p.  137)  emphasized:
A  ﬁrm’s  aspiration  level  in  a  technologically  progressive
environment  is  not  simply  determined  by  past  perfor-
mance  or  the  performance  of  reference  organizations.
Thus,  organizations  with  higher  levels  of  absorptive
capacity  will  tend  to  be  more  proactive,  exploiting  oppor-
tunities  present  in  the  environment,  independent  of
current  performance.
To  sum  up,  absorptive  capacities  contribute  to  a  ﬁrm’s
isk-taking  capabilities  in  two  ways.  First,  ﬁrms  can  perceive
‘windows  of  opportunity’’  in  terms  of  the  ﬁrm’s  endow-
ent  of  absorptive  capacities.  Second,  ﬁrms  with  high  levels
f  absorptive  capacity  are  more  able  to  shape  the  whole
isk-seeking  process,  especially  risk  understanding  and  risk
ssessment.  Thus,  we  propose  the  following  hypothesis.
ypothesis  2.  Firms  equipped  with  more  absorptive  capac-
ties  will  conduct  more  risk-taking  behavior.
he  capabilities  of  allocating  and  diversifying
isk----network  resources
ccording  to  the  analysis  of  Miller  and  Lessard  (2000,  p.
8),  ‘‘risk  management  is  a  sequential  process  that  includes
isk  assessment,  risk  hedging,  risk  diversiﬁcation,  option
reation,  risk  transformation,  and  the  embrace  of  residual
isks.’’  Network  resources  may  help  ﬁrms  with  risk  con-
rol.  In  the  ﬁrst  place,  ﬁrms  may  gain  valuable  information
rom  a  network  of  resources.  It  appears  that  the  greater
he  information,  the  better  the  opportunities  (Gulati,  1999).
pithoven  and  Teirlinck  (2015)  also  suggested  that  network
esources  as  external  resources  can  be  considered  one  of
he  determinants  of  a  ﬁrm’s  risky  R&D  investment.  Thus,
esources  embedded  in  networks  supply  the  channel  with
nformation  that  is  valuable  for  recognizing  proﬁtable  oppor-
unity  as  well  as  risk  appraisal.  In  the  second  place,  network
esources  enhance  the  ability  of  organizations  to  learn
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about  new  alliance  opportunities  with  reliable  partners
(Gulati,  1995).  Firms  can  acquire  complementary  resources
(e.g.,  knowledge,  capital,  technology,  legitimacy,  distribu-
tion  channels,  etc.)  from  cooperation.  Furthermore,  through
strategic  alliances,  ﬁrms  can  transfer  or  share  risk  to  compe-
tent  partners  that  are  capable  of  dealing  with  speciﬁc  risks.
For  example,  coalitions  with  host  governments  or  affected
parties  may  mitigate  institutional  risk.  Likewise,  building
alliances  with  upstream  manufacturers  can  stabilize  input
prices.  Therefore,  ﬁrms  may  attenuate  the  sources  of  uncer-
tainty  through  partnership  arrangements.  Miller  and  Lessard
(2000,  p.  89)  demonstrated  that:
Relative  superiority  in  risk  bearing  may  arise  for  any
one  of  three  reasons:  (1)  some  parties  may  have  more
information  about  particular  risks  and  their  impact  than
others;  (2)  parties  or  stakeholders  may  have  different
degrees  of  inﬂuence  over  outcomes;  (3)  investors  may
differ  in  their  ability  to  diversify  risks.
Thus,  we  see  that  organizations  with  more  network
resources  can  garner  proﬁtable  opportunities  more  effec-
tively  and  strategize  risks,  which  tend  to  take  more  risks.
Hypothesis  3.  Firms  equipped  with  more  network
resources  will  conduct  more  risk-taking  behavior.
The  capabilities  of  buffering  risk----organizational  slack
Firms  with  high  absorptive  capacities  may  foresee  valuable
opportunities  and  therefore  strategize  risks.  However,  orga-
nizational  changes  may  trigger  resource  competition  within
the  organization.  Several  studies  have  agreed  that  organi-
zational  slack  facilitates  risk-seeking  activities  (Cyert  and
March,  1963;  Singh,  1986;  Nohria  and  Gulati,  1996;  Mone
et  al.,  1998;  Chattopadhyay  et  al.,  2001;  Voss  et  al.,  2008).
For  example,  slack  resources  facilitate  product  exploration
(Voss  et  al.,  2008),  risk-taking  (Singh,  1986),  and  innovation
(Nohria  and  Gulati,  1996).  Without  slack  resources,  ﬁrms
are  unlikely  to  create  novelty.  Possessing  a  stock  of  slack
can  protect  organizations  from  uncertainty,  allowing  them
to  time  to  wait  to  realize  improved  performance  after  risk-
taking  strategies.  In  other  words,  the  researchers  suggested
that  slack,  like  a  cushion,  can  buffer  the  impact  of  adverse
environmental  events.  Holding  more  slack  resources  in  an
organization  can  increase  the  possibility  of  experimentation
and  organizational  change  (Cyert  and  March,  1963;  Singh,
1986).
From  the  organizational  theoretical  points  of  view,  the
beneﬁts  of  slack  outweigh  its  costs.  However,  agency  theory
predicts  a  negative  relationship  between  slack  and  perfor-
mance  because  slack  may  cause  agency  problems  that  breed
inefﬁciency  (Tan  and  Peng,  2003).  Even  though  the  relation-
ship  between  slack  and  performance  is  tangled,  researchers
generally  believe  that  organizational  slack  initiates  higher
risk  strategic  behaviors  such  as  diversifying  to  new  products
or  new  markets.  Hence,  we  hypothesize  that  risk-seeking
decisions  are  more  likely  to  be  supported  and  to  gain  legiti-
macy  within  an  organization  when  there  are  sufﬁcient  slack
resources  in  the  ﬁrm.
Hypothesis  4.  Firms  equipped  with  more  organizational
slack  will  conduct  more  risk-taking  behavior.
D
T
tigure  1  The  hypothesized  model  of  the  determinants  of  risk-
aking  behavior.
he  moderating  role  of  risk-taking  capabilities  on
he relationship  between  past  performance  and
isk-taking behavior
n  line  with  the  forgoing  assertion,  we  will  try  to  recon-
ile  the  arguments  of  threat-rigidity  hypothesis  with  those
f  the  RBV  risk-based  viewpoint  to  predict  the  risk-taking
ehavior  of  a  ﬁrm.  We  see  from  the  literature  that  prospect
heory  originally  dealt  with  the  relationship  between  risk
ttitude  and  current  position  compared  to  a  reference  point.
owever,  the  threat-rigidity  hypothesis  maintained  that  an
rganization  was  incapable  of  dealing  with  adverse  environ-
ents.  Thus,  as  Ocasio  (1995)  pointed  out,  threat-rigidity  is
ssociated  with  uncertainty  and  uncontrollability,  whereas
rospect  theory  is  associated  with  loss.  To  reconcile  these
wo  arguments,  we  can  determine  that  whether  an  environ-
ental  event  is  interpreted  as  a  threat  or  an  opportunity  is
ontingent  on  an  organization’s  resource  endowments.  That
s,  ﬁrms  are  inclined  to  interpret  new  issues  as  opportunities
hen  they  are  able  to  deal  with  them.  Thus,  we  hypothesize
hat  risk-taking  capabilities  could  moderate  the  relation-
hip  between  past  performance  and  risk-taking  behavior,
nd  depict  the  research  framework  as  shown  in  Fig.  1.
ypothesis  5.  The  relationship  between  past  performance
nd  risk-taking  behavior  is  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with  more
bsorptive  capacities  than  for  ﬁrms  with  fewer  absorptive
apacities.
ypothesis  6.  The  relationship  between  past  performance
nd  risk-taking  behavior  is  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with
ore  network  resources  than  for  ﬁrms  with  fewer  network
esources.
ypothesis  7.  The  relationship  between  past  performance
nd  risk-taking  behavior  is  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with  more
rganizational  slack  than  for  ﬁrms  with  less  organizational
lack.ata and method
he  empirical  context  of  this  study  considers  the  informa-
ion  technology  and  electronics  industries  for  two  reasons.
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irst,  ﬁrms  in  these  industries  encounter  much  uncer-
ainty  regarding  quickly  shifting  consumer  demand  and
apid  developments  in  technology.  Second,  these  ﬁrms  are
nclined  toward  high-risk  strategic  investments  such  as
ergers,  acquisitions,  and  vertical  or  horizontal  integration
ecause  of  the  pressures  of  hyper-competition.  Therefore,
hese  high-technology  industries  are  good  examples  for
tudying  the  drivers  of  risk-taking  activities  and  the  con-
equences  on  performance.
We  collected  data  from  the  Taiwan  Economic  Journal
TEJ)  Financial  Data  Bank  and  the  Corporate  Governance
ata  Set.  The  samples  included  ﬁrms  that  went  IPO  before
003  and  survived  until  at  least  2007.  After  culling  ﬁrms
ith  missing  values  in  the  preliminary  dataset-278  ﬁrms,  we
cquired  the  ﬁnancial  data  and  the  corporate  governance
nformation  of  230  ﬁrms.  They  come  from  8  segmentations  of
igh-tech  industry-semiconductor,  computer  and  peripheral
quipment,  optoelectronics,  communications  and  Internet,
lectronic  components,  electronic  products  distribution,
nformation  services,  and  other  electronics.  Since  Chou
nd  Yang  (2011)  argued  that  ‘‘the  story  of  Taiwan’s  rise
o  prominence  in  the  high-tech  sector  provides  an  inter-
sting  example  for  other  economies.  After  more  than  50
ears  of  joint  endeavors  between  government  and  busi-
ess,  the  high-tech  industry  is  performing  well.  (p.  67)’’  so
hat  Taiwan’s  high-tech  industrial  development  can  serve
s  ﬁtted  sample  for  this  study.  Then,  a  cross-sectional
nalysis  was  employed  to  test  the  hypotheses  in  this
tudy.
easurements
isk-taking  behavior
he  risk  behavior  can  reﬂect  risky  investment  (Kraiczy  et  al.,
015),  especially  on  related  diversiﬁcation,  therefore,  we
ested  our  hypotheses  in  the  context  of  diversiﬁcation  and
easured  risk-taking  behavior  at  the  ﬁrm  level  by  three
imensions:  (1)  the  proportion  of  investment,  (2)  variances
f  return  on  investment  (ROI)  of  target  ﬁrms,  and  (3)
elatedness  between  focal  ﬁrm  and  target  ﬁrms.
We  calculated  the  proportion  of  investment  as  invest-
ent  in  equity  securities  with  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence  over  total
ssets  in  the  year  2006.  This  deﬁnition  eliminates  invest-
ents  in  debt  securities  and  available-for-sale  securities,
hich  are  recorded  as  long-term  investment  accounts  on
alance  sheets  and  do  not  concern  us.  When  the  focal
rm  acknowledges  a  substantive  economic  relationship  with
 target  ﬁrm,  for  example  a  ‘‘signiﬁcant  inﬂuence’’  or
‘controlling  interest’’  (generally  an  investment  of  20%  or
ore),  the  focal  ﬁrm  must  account  for  the  investments
sing  the  equity  method  in  accounting.  In  the  other  words,
he  focal  ﬁrm  indicates  high  resource  commitment  (and
herefore  high-risk  involvement)  in  the  target  ﬁrm  via  the
quity  method.  Hence,  it  is  reasonable  to  perceive  increas-
ng  investment  using  the  equity  method  as  a  measure  of
he  degree  of  exposure  risk.  In  other  words,  greater  equity
nvestment  indicates  greater  risk  exposure  for  the  investing
orporation.  We  divided  equity  investments  by  total  assets
o  control  ﬁrm  size  effect.
The  second  indicator  is  variances  of  ROI  of  target  ﬁrms.
revious  studies  have  deﬁned  risk  as  the  unpredictability  of
f
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ncome  stream  (Bowman,  1980;  Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,
988;  Bromiley,  1991).  The  greater  the  variances  of  target
rms’  ROI,  the  less  predictable  the  investing  income  stream
nd  consequently  the  more  risk.  We  averaged  the  variances
f  ROI  within  the  ﬁve  years  before  2006  to  measure  the
isk  of  target  ﬁrms  and  averaged  the  number  of  each  tar-
et  ﬁrm  to  form  a  single  number  for  measuring  the  focal
rm’s  investing  risk.
The  third  indicator  of  risk-taking  behavior  is  relatedness
etween  focal  ﬁrm  and  target  ﬁrms.  Previous  research  has
ound  that  the  performance  of  related  diversiﬁcation  was
etter  than  unrelated  diversiﬁcation  under  the  rationale  of
esources  leverage  or  organizational  synergy  (Rumelt,  1984;
ontgomery  and  Wernerfelt,  1988;  Simmonds,  1990).  Thus,
ocal  ﬁrms  will  incur  more  risks  when  they  enter  unrelated
usinesses.  We  used  the  North  American  Industry  Classiﬁca-
ion  System  (NAICS)  six-digit  code  to  ﬁnd  the  industry  code
or  focal  ﬁrm  and  target  ﬁrm  and  deﬁned  that  two  busi-
esses  are  related  if  they  are  within  the  same  four-digit
ode.  We  coded  relatedness  as  ‘‘0’’  and  otherwise  ‘‘1,’’  and
hen  averaged  the  number  of  unrelatedness  over  the  num-
er  of  total  target  ﬁrms  to  form  a single  number  to  measure
he  focal  ﬁrm’s  risk  behavior.  It  is  plausible  to  predict  that
he  higher  the  ratio,  the  more  risk  the  focal  ﬁrm  will  have
o  bear.
We  employed  a  factor  analysis  with  the  three  measure-
ents  to  form  a  single  indicator  for  risk-taking  behavior.
he  results  showed  that  all  are  loaded  above  0.5  on  a  single
actor  with  an  eigenvalue  of  1.265,  and  the  factor  loading
as  0.68,  0.50,  and  0.75,  respectively.  Then  we  used  factor
core  to  measure  the  focal  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  behavior.  The
actor  score  shows  the  degree  of  the  focal  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking
ehavior  in  the  context  of  diversiﬁcation.
We  then  discussed  the  measurements  of  independent
ariables.  To  stabilize  the  value  of  independent  variables,
e  used  the  average  number  of  the  three  years  before  2006
o  predict  the  dependent  variable.
ast  performance
ales  growth. According  to  prospect  theory,  the  choice  of
eference  points  will  inﬂuence  the  perception  of  decision-
akers  about  negatives  or  positives.  In  previous  research,
rganizations  commonly  selected  their  reference  point,
spiration  level,  or  multidimensional  strategic  reference
oints  on  the  basis  of  their  own  past  performances  and
he  average  performance  of  the  industry  (Bromiley,  1991;
yert  and  March,  1963;  Fiegenbaum  and  Thomas,  1988;
iegenbaum  et  al.,  1996;  Shoham  and  Fiegenbaum,  2002;
iseman  and  Bromiley,  1996).  As  the  samples  of  this  study
resent  business-to-business  relationships  in  the  markets,
ales  growth  can  be  regarded  a  suitable  indicators  to  mea-
ure  a  ﬁrm’s  past  performance  as  a  reference  point  (Tuli
t  al.,  2010).  We  chose  sales  growth  to  measure  the  focal
rm’s  sales  performance  in  its  core  business  (Stam  and
lfring,  2008).  Sales  growth  was  calculated  as  the  percent
hange  in  total  sales  over  the  previous  year.  We  averaged
ales  growth  of  the  previous  three  years  as  the  proxy  of  the
ocal  ﬁrms’  sales  performance.  To  control  industry  effect,
e  separated  our  data  into  eight  segments  according  to
he  categories  of  Taiwan  Stock  Exchange  (TSE):  semiconduc-
or,  computer  and  peripheral  equipment,  optoelectronics,
c
a
a
b
s
g
f
t
r
(
g
t
a
ﬁ
e
a
m
o
O
I
i
r
r
m
T
s
s
L
r
s
r
e
r
c
1
1
h
k
s
s
a
c
a
c
t
1
i
s
r
s
i
rWhat  makes  ﬁrms  embrace  risks?  
communications  and  Internet,  electronic  components,  elec-
tronic  products  distribution,  information  services,  and  other
electronics.  We  calculated  the  mean  of  sales  growth  in  each
segment  as  a  benchmark,  and  then  subtracted  the  indus-
try  mean  from  own  performance  to  measure  the  focal  ﬁrm’s
relative  sales  performance.
Risk-taking  capabilities
In  the  previous  discussions,  we  deconstructed  risk-taking
capabilities  into  three  dimensions----absorptive  capacity,  net-
work  resources,  and  organizational  slack.  The  variables  to
measure  these  concepts  are  discussed  below.
Absorptive  capacity
R&D  intensity.  A  ﬁrm’s  absorptive  capacity  is  measured
by  R&D  intensity,  which  is  calculated  as  the  ratio  of  R&D
expenditures  to  sales  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990;  Tsai,
2001;  Luan  and  Tang,  2007;  Ben-Oz  and  Greve,  2012).
Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1990)  suggested  that  R&D  expendi-
ture  contributes  to  a  ﬁrm  in  two  ways,  ﬁrst  by  creating
new  knowledge  and  then  by  broadening  the  ﬁrm’s  absorptive
capacity.  In  high-technology  industries,  R&D  expenditure  is
always  related  to  a  ﬁrm’s  internal  capabilities  (Spithoven
and  Teirlinck,  2015).  Thus,  it  seems  reasonable  to  sup-
pose  that  R&D  intensity  correlates  positively  with  identifying
valuable  opportunities  and  enabling  the  ﬁrm  to  engage  in
risk-taking  activities.
Investing  experience. In  the  context  of  investment
decision-making,  we  adopted  a  different  indicator  to
measure  absorptive  capacity,  namely  the  ﬁrm’s  previous
investing  experience.  The  development  of  absorptive  capac-
ity  is  somewhat  ‘‘domain-speciﬁc’’  and  ‘‘path-dependent’’
(Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990).  Previous  investing  experience,
whether  successful  or  not,  contributes  to  a  ﬁrm’s  speciﬁc
knowledge  or  rigidity  (Meschi  and  Métais,  2015),  or  accu-
mulate  management  capabilities  (Geppert  et  al.,  2013).
Such  experience  is  tacit  and  guides  the  cognitive  forma-
tion  of  decision-makers.  Furthermore,  the  experience  can
inﬂuence  a  ﬁrm’s  ability  to  map  and  face  the  risk  landscape
(Miller  and  Lessard,  2000).  Meschi  and  Métais  (2015)  found
that  failure  experience  of  M&A  is  negatively  correlated  with
future  acquisition  performance.  To  sum  up,  the  beneﬁts  of
experience  can  translate  into  speciﬁc  knowledge  regarding
management  of  project  risk.  We  used  average  investing
experience,  calculated  as  the  average  ratio  of  long-term
investments  to  total  equity  in  the  previous  three  years,
to  represent  potential  absorptive  capacity,  since  a  ﬁrm’s
investing  experience  is  positively  correlated  with  risk-taking
capabilities.
Network  resources
Board  size.  We  use  board  size,  the  number  of  members  on
the  board,  to  measure  an  organization’s  ability  to  acquire
critical  resources  from  external  linkages.  The  relation-
ship  between  board  size  and  performance  remains  unclear.
According  to  resource  dependence  theory,  larger  boards  are
positively  associated  with  ﬁrm  performance  because  larger
boards  have  more  potential  for  gathering  complementary
resources.  However,  larger  boards  may  be  less  cohesive  and
less  able  to  reach  consensus,  which  leads  to  dysfunction
in  decision-making  (Dalton  et  al.,  1999).  In  this  study,  we
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onsider  the  beneﬁt  of  larger  boards  with  regard  to  improved
cquisition  of  external  information  or  resources.  Thus,  we
ssert  that  larger  boards  contribute  to  risk-taking  capability
y  increasing  potential  channels  of  external  resources.
Linkages  to  government  and  banks. Creating  relation-
hips  with  governments  may  generate  support  from  related
overnmental  institutions  and  sometimes  protect  focal  ﬁrms
rom  political  and  economic  risk.  Linkages  to  ﬁnancial  insti-
utions  often  supply  a  channel  to  generate  loans  at  a
elatively  lower  market  rate  (Lee  et  al.,  2001).  Lee  et  al.
2001)  hypothesized  that  linkages  to  commercial  banks  and
overnment  agencies  will  improve  the  performance  of  a
echnological  start-up  company.  Stam  and  Elfring  (2008)
rgued  that  bridge  ties,  such  as  ﬁnancial  institutions,  law
rms,  and  so  on,  will  moderate  the  relationship  between
ntrepreneurial  orientation  and  performance.  Thus,  we
ssume  that  focal  ﬁrms  will  beneﬁt  from  linkages  to  govern-
ents  and  banks.  We  measured  these  linkages  by  the  ratio
f  shares  held  by  governments  and  banks  over  total  shares.
rganizational  slack
n  the  early  research,  organizational  slack  is  usually  divided
nto  unabsorbed  slack  and  absorbed  slack.  The  former  is
elated  to  excess,  uncommitted,  and  easily  redeployed
esources;  the  later  corresponds  to  excess  cost  and  com-
itted  resources  (Singh,  1986;  Hambrick  and  D’Aveni,  1988;
an  and  Peng,  2003).  Other  researchers  divide  organizational
lack  into  recoverable  slack,  available  slack,  and  potential
lack  (Bromiley,  1991;  Cheng  and  Kesner,  1997;  Reuer  and
eiblein,  2000).  One  may  notice  that  the  measurements  of
ecoverable  slack  and  available  slack  are  all  connected  to
hort-run  indices  such  as  current  ratio,  working  capital,  the
atio  of  accounts  receivable  to  sales,  the  ratio  of  operating
xpenses  over  sales,  etc.  However,  potential  resources  are
elated  to  long-term  indices.  For  example,  potential  slack
an  be  measured  by  the  ratio  of  debt  to  equity  (Bromiley,
991) or  by  the  ratio  of  equity  to  debt  (Cheng  and  Kesner,
997).  In  addition  to  ﬁnancial  slack,  Voss  et  al.  (2008)
ypothesized  that  product  exploration  was  related  to  other
inds  of  slack,  such  as  customer  relational  slack,  operational
lack,  and  human  resource  slack.
In  our  empirical  setting,  we  adopt  two  kinds  of  ﬁnancial
lacks  to  measure  organizational  slack.
Current  ratio.  A  company’s  current  ratio,  i.e.,  current
ssets  divided  by  current  liabilities,  can  be  used  as  an  indi-
ator  of  liquidity  ratios  that  measure  a  company’s  short-run
bilities  to  pay  its  maturing  obligations.  Researchers  use
urrent  ratio  to  represent  available  slack  that  is  uncommit-
ed  and  easily  redeployed  within  the  organization  (Bromiley,
991;  Cheng  and  Kesner,  1997).  We  assume  that  current  ratio
s  positively  correlated  with  risk-taking  capabilities  in  the
hort-run.
Debt  ratio. We  employed  debt  ratio,  calculated  as  the
atio  of  debt  to  total  assets,  as  the  proxy  of  a  ﬁrm’s  potential
lack,  which  represents  the  focal  ﬁrm’s  borrowing  capac-
ties.  A  ﬁrm  with  a  high  debt  to  total  assets  ratio  has  a
elatively  low  shield  against  long-term  creditors  and  thus
as  little  future  borrowing  potential.  For  the  purpose  of
ontrolling  a  target  ﬁrm,  the  focal  ﬁrm  should  preserve
ufﬁcient  ﬁnancial  slack  to  deal  with  turbulence  or  shock.
onsequently,  it  is  reasonable  to  predict  that  there  is  a
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.26  
egative  correlation  between  debt  ratio  and  risk-taking
apabilities.
ontrol  variables
ince  the  composition  of  a  board  can  be  highly  correlated
ith  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  behavior,  we  control  for  ﬁrm  board
ndependence.  ‘‘Board  independence  implies  a  board  is
ble  or  willing  to  provide  guidance  that  does  not  neces-
arily  mirror  the  will  of  the  CEO’’  (Dalton  et  al.,  1999,
.  678).  It  is  plausible  that  top  managers  might  take  a
igh-risk  investment  at  the  expense  of  principals.  The  num-
er  of  outside  directors  is  usually  a  measurement  of  board
ndependence,  and  a  high  proportion  of  outsiders  is  asso-
iated  with  higher  ﬁnancial  performance.  It  is  generally
greed  that  outsiders  act  as  a  monitoring  mechanism  that
elps  mitigate  agency  problems,  but  we  should  not  overlook
he  fact  outside  directors  are  employed  by  the  CEO.  Thus,
 high  proportion  of  outsiders  cannot  guarantee  a  reduc-
ion  of  agency  problems.  We  adopt  two  indices  to  measure
oard  independence----shareholding  ratio  of  major  share-
olders  and  seating-controlled  ratio  of  major  shareholders.
e  obtain  this  data  from  the  TEJ  Corporate  Governance
ataset.  We  assumed  that  major  stockholders  will  engage  in
igh-risk  activities  if  there  are  not  appropriate  monitoring
echanisms.  We  also  control  for  ﬁrm  age,  because  the  age
f  a  ﬁrm  is  generally  thought  to  induce  organizational  iner-
ia  and  thus  reduce  the  possibility  of  organizational  changes.
hat  is,  younger  ﬁrms  are  more  inclined  to  take  risks  than
lder  ﬁrms.
ethod
e  employed  multiple  regressions  to  test  our  hypothe-
es.  To  test  the  additive  effects  of  past  performance,
isk-taking  capabilities,  and  between  interaction  past  per-
ormance  and  risk-taking  capabilities,  we  ran  several  models
or  each  set  of  independent  variables.  Model  1  consists
f  all  control  variables  as  a  benchmark.  Model  2  tests
ll  of  our  hypothesized  main  effects.  To  test  interaction
ffect  of  past  performance  and  risk-taking  capabilities,  we
reated  six  interactions  terms.  To  minimize  collinearity,
e  mean-center  the  independent  variables  before  creating
nteraction  terms.  We  did  not  dump  all  interaction  varia-
les  into  a  single  model  because  the  correlations  between
ome  interaction  terms  are  too  high  (Lee  et  al.,  2001).  To
void  multicollinearity  problems,  we  ran  separate  regres-
ion  models  to  test  our  interaction  items.  Interaction  effects
f  past  performance  and  absorptive  capacities,  network
esource,  and  organizational  slack  were  added  in  Models  3,
,  and  5,  respectively.  Table  2  shows  the  descriptive  statis-
ics  and  correlation  matrix  of  the  variables  in  these  models.
esults and discussion
able  3  shows  the  results  of  the  regression  analyses.  Model  1
ests  for  the  net  effect  associated  with  the  control  variables,
hich  explains  a  signiﬁcant  share  of  the  variance  in  risk-
aking  behavior  (Model  1:  R2 =  0.381,  p  <  0.001).  The  results
or  the  control  variables  are  reasonable.  High  levels  of  share
wnership  or  seats-controlled  may  result  in  high  risk-taking
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Table  3  Result  of  regression  analyses.a
Dependent  variable:  risk-taking  behavior
Variables  Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5
Control  variables
Age  .034  −.280  −.057  −.028  −.032
Seating-controlled  Ratio  .361*** .285*** .270*** .269*** .272***
Shareholding  ratio  of  major  shareholders  .150* .114* .111* .133** .079
Main effects
Sales  growth .198* .177* .014  .169*
R&D  intensity −.109 −.049 −.056 −.102
Investing  experience .217*** .402*** .225*** .217***
Board  size −.046 −.054 −.067 −.078
Linkage  to  governance  and  bank  .107† .104† .125** .097
Current ratio  −.172† −.183  −.286** −.266*
Debt  ratio  −.126† −.082  −.083  −.144†
Interactions
Sales  growth  *  R&D  Intensity .428**
Sales  growth  *  investing  experience .503***
Sales  growth  *  board  size −.124†
Sales  growth  *  linkage  to  government  and  bank −.120
Sales  growth  *  current  ratio .483**
Sales  growth  *  debt  ratio .291***
R2 .381  .484  .542  .512  .517
R2 .103*** .058*** .028* .033**
Adjusted  R2 .134  .200  .255  .221  .267
F-value 12.792*** 6.715*** 7.526*** 6.409*** 6.594***
N  230  230  230  230  230
a Standardized coefﬁcients are reported.
† p < 0.1.
* p < 0.05.
**
r
n
r
b
t
W
t
d
p
H
t
b
t
(
a
t
o
tp < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
of  ﬁrm  because  of  lack  of  strong  monitoring.  Age  is  not  sig-
niﬁcantly  associated  with  risk-taking  behavior  in  our  model.
Model  2  shows  that  the  direct  effects  of  past  performance
and  risk-taking  capabilities  explain  a  signiﬁcant  portion  of
the  variance  in  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  2:  R2 =  0.484,
p  <  0.001;  R2 =  0.103,  p  <  0.001).
Model  2  reports  the  results  for  our  hypotheses.
Hypothesis  1a,  which  agrees  with  prospect  theory  by  pre-
dicting  a  negative  association  between  past  performance
and  risk-taking  behavior,  is  not  supported  by  our  data.
In  fact,  our  data  indicates  that  the  relationship  between
past  performance  and  risk-taking  behavior  is  positive.  This
result  is  consistent  with  the  arguments  of  the  threat-rigidity
hypothesis  (ˇ  =  .198,  p  <  0.05),  which  implies  that  better  past
performance  tends  to  increase  risk-taking  behavior.  Thus,
Hypothesis  1b  received  moderate  support.
Hypothesis  2  suggests  that  absorptive  capacity  is  posi-
tively  associated  with  risk-taking  behavior.  Using  previous
investing  experience  as  a  measurement  of  absorptive
capacity,  we  found  a  positive  association  with  increased
risk-taking  behavior  i.e.,  the  coefﬁcient  for  previous  invest-
ing  experience  is  positive  and  strongly  signiﬁcant  (ˇ  =  .217,
p  <  0.001).  Although  we  also  predicted  that  R&D  intensity
should  be  positively  related  to  risk-taking  behavior,  our
p
r
s
eesults  produced  diverse  results  (ˇ  =  −.109,  n.s.)  that  are
ot  signiﬁcant.  Thus,  Hypothesis  2  is  partially  supported.
Regarding  Hypothesis  3,  which  suggested  that  network
esources  are  positively  associated  with  risk-taking  behavior,
oard  size  is  found  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  risk-
aking  behavior,  but  it  is  not  signiﬁcant  (ˇ  =  −.046,  n.s.).
e  also  predicted  a  positive  relationship  between  linkages
o  governments  and  banks  and  risk-taking  behavior,  a  pre-
iction  supported  by  our  data.  The  coefﬁcient  for  linkages  is
ositive  and  marginally  signiﬁcant  (ˇ  =  .107,  p  <  0.1).  Thus,
ypothesis  3  is  also  supported  partially.
In  keeping  with  Hypothesis  4, which  predicts  a  posi-
ive  association  between  organizational  slack  and  risk-taking
ehavior,  the  debt  ratio  shows  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence  on  risk-
aking  behavior.  The  coefﬁcient  for  the  debt  ratio  is  negative
ˇ  =  −.126,  p  <  0.1),  and  the  result  is  plausible.  A  ﬁrm  with
 high  debt  ratio  will  have  reduced  borrowing  capacities  in
he  future,  hence  inhibiting  risk-taking  investment.  On  the
ther  hand,  the  relationship  between  current  ratio  and  risk-
aking  behavior  is  also  signiﬁcant  (ˇ  =  −.172,  p  <  0.1),  but  it
roduced  diverse  results.  The  reason  may  be  that  the  cur-
ent  ratio  is  a measure  of  short-term  solvency  that  cannot
atisfy  the  need  for  long-term  cash  ﬂow.  Thus,  ﬁrms  keep
nough  current  assets  to  deal  with  short-term  needs  and
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cFigure  2  Moderating  effects  of  risk-taking  capabilities  on  th
ence  crowd  the  need  of  long-term  investments.  The  other
eason  may  be  that  inventory  accounts  for  a  large  portion
f  current  assets,  but  inventory  cannot  supply  the  cash  ﬂow
f  long-term  investments  in  time.  Hence,  Hypothesis  4  is
upported  partially.
We  test  our  contingency  hypotheses  in  Models  3,  4,  and
.  Model  3  shows  that  the  interaction  effects  of  past  per-
ormance  and  absorptive  capacities  explain  a  signiﬁcant
ortion  of  the  variance  in  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  3:
2 =  0.542,  p  <  0.001;  R2 =  0.058,  p  <  0.001).  Hypothesis  5
redicts  that  the  association  between  past  performance  and
isk-taking  behavior  will  be  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with
igh  absorptive  capacities  than  for  ﬁrms  with  low  absorp-
ive  capacities.  We  found  strong  support  for  this  hypothesis.
he  results  in  Model  3  showed  that  the  interaction  between
ales  growth  and  R&D  has  a  statistically  signiﬁcant,  positive
ffect  on  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  3:  ˇ  =  .428,  p  <  0.01).
he  interaction  between  sales  growth  and  investing  expe-
ience  also  has  a  statistically  signiﬁcant,  positive  effect  on
isk-taking  behavior  (Model  3:  ˇ  =  .503,  p  <  0.001).
Model  4  shows  that  the  interaction  effects  of  past  perfor-
ance  and  network  resources  explain  a  signiﬁcant  portion
f  the  variance  in  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  4:  R2 =  0.512,
 <  0.001;  R2 =  0.028,  p  <  0.05).  Hypothesis  6  predicts  that
he  association  between  past  performance  and  risk-taking
ehavior  will  be  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with  high  network
esources  than  for  ﬁrms  with  low  network  resources.  The
esults  in  Model  4  show  that  the  interaction  between  sales
rowth  and  board  size  has  a  marginally  signiﬁcant,  negative
ffect  on  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  5:  ˇ  =  −.124,  p  <  0.1).
ur  data  produced  diverse  results  for  Hypothesis  6. The  rea-
on  may  be  that  larger  boards  may  be  less  cohesive  and
ess  able  to  reach  consensus,  which  leads  to  dysfunction  in
ecision-making  (Cheng,  2008;  Dalton  et  al.,  1999).  Thus,
rms  with  large  boards  will  ﬁnd  it  more  difﬁcult  to  facilitate
W
a
d
pationship  between  past  performance  and  risk-taking  behavior.
 high-risk  strategy  than  ﬁrms  with  small  boards.  The  inter-
ction  between  sales  growth  and  linkage  to  governments  and
anks  has  a  negative  but  insigniﬁcant  relationship  with  risk-
aking  behavior  (Model  4:  ˇ  =  −.120,  n.s.).  Thus,  Hypothesis
 is  not  supported.
Model  5  shows  the  interaction  effects  of  past  per-
ormance  and  organizational  slack.  The  addition  of  this
nteraction  term  signiﬁcantly  increased  the  variance
xplained  in  risk-taking  behavior  (Model  5:  R2 =  0.517,
 < 0.001;  R2 =  0.033,  p  <  0.01).  Hypothesis  7  predicts  that
he  association  between  past  performance  and  risk-taking
ehavior  will  be  more  positive  for  ﬁrms  with  high  organiza-
ional  slacks  than  for  ﬁrms  with  low  organizational  slacks.  As
hown  in  Model  5,  the  interactive  effect  of  sales  growth  and
urrent  ratio  is  positive  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  (Model  5:
 =  .483,  p  <  0.01).  The  result  is  consistent  with  our  predic-
ion.  However,  we  found  diverse  results  of  interactive  effect
etween  debt  ratio  and  sales  growth  in  risk-taking  behavior
Model  5:  ˇ  =  .291,  p  <  0.001).  Aggregating  the  results  from
odels  4  and  5,  we  also  observed  that  linkage  to  govern-
ents  and  banks  is  strongly  signiﬁcant  in  Model  4 (ˇ  =  .125,
 < 0.01).  Thus,  the  reason  may  be  the  focal  ﬁrms  could
cquire  support  from  government  or  banks,  and  therefore
dopt  a  high  debt  policy.  This  can  reﬂect  that  the  business-
overnment  relationship  has  been  highly  correlated  with
oans  of  businesses  in  emerging  economies  (Chung,  2006;
ark,  1990).
To  better  understand  the  interaction  effects,  we  plotted
he  relationship  between  past  performance  and  risk-taking
ehavior  at  high  and  low  levels,  separately,  of  absorptive
apacities,  network  resources,  and  organizational  slacks.
e  deﬁne  the  low  level  as  the  minus  one  standard  devi-
tion  from  the  mean  and  high  level  as  plus  one  standard
eviation  from  the  mean.  Fig.  2  shows  the  results.  Sup-
orting  Hypothesis  5,  Fig.  2a  shows  that  the  relationship
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other  sectors  in  other  economies.  Hence,  the  empirical  ﬁnd-
ings  may  restrict  generalizability  of  these  results  to  other
industries  or  other  economies.  In  future  research,  this  studyWhat  makes  ﬁrms  embrace  risks?  
between  sales  growth  and  risk-taking  behavior  is  strongly
positive  when  R&D  is  high  and  negative  when  R&D  is  low.
Fig.  2b  indicates  that  the  relationship  between  sales  growth
and  risk-taking  behavior  is  strongly  positive  when  investing
experience  is  high  and  negative  when  investing  experience
is  low.
Contrary  to  the  prediction  of  Hypothesis  6,  Fig.  2c
indicates  that  the  relationship  between  sales  growth  and
risk-taking  behavior  is  positive  when  board  size  is  low  and
becomes  insigniﬁcant  when  board  size  is  high.  However,
partial  supporting  Hypothesis  7,  Fig.  2d  shows  that  the  rela-
tionship  between  sales  growth  and  risk-taking  behavior  is
strongly  positive  when  current  ratio  is  high  and  negative
when  current  ratio  is  low.  Fig.  2e  shows  that  the  relationship
between  sales  growth  and  risk-taking  behavior  is  positive
when  debt  ratio  is  high  and  negative  when  debt  ratio  is  low.
Conclusion and  contribution
In  conclusion,  as  far  as  the  factors  inﬂuencing  a  ﬁrm’s
risk-taking  behavior  are  concerned,  the  good  conditions
of  ﬁrm  performance,  investing  experience,  the  link-
ages  to  governments  and  banks,  slacks,  and  some  joint
efforts----interactions  between  ﬁrm  performance  and  absorp-
tive  capacity,  and  slack----can  further  make  ﬁrms  embrace
risks.  However,  are  the  two  perspectives  of  prospect  the-
ory  and  threat  rigidity  hypothesis  aligned  with  the  opposite
prediction  signs  about  the  impact  of  ﬁrm  performance  on
risk-taking  behavior?  The  evidence-based  ﬁndings  provide
some  insights  toward  this  theoretical  debate.  As  ﬁrms  have
a  low  level  of  R&D  intensity,  a  low  level  of  investing  experi-
ence,  and  a  low  level  of  current  ratio  (see  Fig.  2a,  b  and  d),
ﬁrm  performance  is  negatively  correlated  with  risk-taking
behavior.  This  is  consistent  with  the  prospect  theory  argu-
ment  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979),  implying  that  ﬁrms  are
inclined  to  risk  seeking  when  they  are  in  a  negative  condition
and  equipped  with  low  risk-taking  capabilities.  Firms  engage
in  high-risk  activities  because  they  feel  they  have  little  to
lose,  and  then  discount  the  impact  of  future  losses  in  the
hope  of  achieving  substantial  gains.  The  gambler-like  intent
presents  that  the  ﬁrms  have  no  choice.  On  the  other  hand,
these  ﬁgures  above  reveal  positive  slopes  between  ﬁrm  per-
formance  and  risk-taking  behavior  given  a  higher  level  of
absorptive  capacity  and  organization  slack,  and  the  posi-
tive  slopes  indicate  that  the  predictions  of  threat-rigidity
hypotheses  are  robust:  ﬁrms  perceiving  threat  will  prefer
less  risky  alternatives  (Shimizu,  2007).  Thus,  this  research
contributes  by  incorporating  the  role  of  risk-taking  capa-
bilities  to  better  understand  factors  affecting  risk-taking
behavior  and  to  settle  the  theoretical  debate  between
prospect  theory  and  threat-rigidity  hypotheses.
This  study  also  contributes  by  categorizing  risk-taking
capabilities  (i.e.,  absorptive  capacity,  network  resources,
and  organizational  slack).  The  evidence-based  ﬁndings
demonstrate  that  these  capabilities  can  not  only  mitigate
risks  but  also  interact  with  status  of  ﬁrm  performance  so
that  ﬁrms  equipping  with  these  capabilities  are  likely  to
embrace  risks.  This  kind  of  categorization  concerning  risk-
taking  capabilities  is  related  to  different  levels  of  risks  a
ﬁrm  can  deal  with.  Albeit  a  pilot  run,  we  propose  this  to
0
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ifferentiate  risks  and  classify  risk-taking  capabilities  to
pply  for  future  research.
In addition,  the  empirical  results  may  provide  multiple
anagerial  implications.  First,  decision  makers  should  take
he  ﬁrm’s  performance  as  well  as  risk-taking  capabilities
nto  consideration  as  making  risky  strategic  or  investment
ecisions.  Not  only  the  performance  level  and  risk-taking
apabilities  themselves  but  also  their  interactive  effects
an  inﬂuence  risk-taking  behavior.  To  increase  the  level  of
 ﬁrm’s  risk  bearing,  managers  should  implement  strate-
ic  plans  to  accumulate  these  risk-taking  capabilities,  for
nstance,  via  maintaining  the  competitive  R&D  investment,
earning  from  investment  experience,  keeping  a  healthy
nancial  status  and  loan  borrowing  capabilities,  and  build-
ng  a  good  relationship  with  government  and  banks.  For
nstance,  CPC  Corporation,  Taiwan,  with  supports  of  MEGA
nternational  Commercial  Bank,  has  cooperated  with  Japan
ank  for  International  Cooperation,  and  conducted  a  risky
nvestment  to  expand  the  ﬁrm’s  businesses.2 These  practices
re  beneﬁcial  to  evaluate  and  establish  risk-taking  capabil-
ties  that  can  increase  level  of  a  ﬁrm’s  taking  risks.
This  paper  also  provides  implications  for  investment
nstitutions.  High  risk  implies  high  returns  (Kiymaz,  2015),
owever,  it  also  implies  greater  variance  about  the  return
f  investment.  To  tolerate  the  risks,  investment  institu-
ions  can  take  these  aspects  of  risk-taking  capabilities  into
ccount  to  evaluate  whether  a  ﬁrm’s  risk-taking  behavior  is
n  accordance  with  risk-taking  capabilities.  The  capabilities
an  imply  a  ﬁrm’s  capabilities  to  bear  risks  as  well  as  to
ccomplish  its  strategic  intent.  For  example,  the  slack  level
f  Foxconn  (TW-2317)  is  quite  high  and  has  been  appreciated
y  several  foreign  investment  institutions  (FII).3 Moreover,
overnments  of  emerging  economies  have  adjusted  poli-
ies  to  invite  FII  to  infuse  investment  into  infrastructures
nd  important  industries,  and  the  evidence-based  ﬁndings
rom  Taiwan  can  offer  some  critical  evaluation  criteria  for
hese  FII  toward  their  investment  decisions  in  emerging
conomies.
The  paper  has  certain  limitations,  as  follows.  First,  we
nly  use  speciﬁc  measurements  of  risk-taking  capabilities  in
 context  of  diversiﬁcation.  This  method  may,  in  fact,  limit
eneralizability.  Text  mining  techniques,  such  as  natural  lan-
uage  processing,  could  be  useful  to  reach  a higher  level
f  consistency  with  the  focal  ﬁrm’s  strategic  development
aths.  Hence,  future  research  may  consider  a  qualitative
pproach  (obtained  via  in-depth  interviews  or  natural  lan-
uage  processing)  to  supplement  the  studies.
Second,  we  focus  on  ﬁrms’  ﬁnancial  aspects  about  risk-
aking  for  this  study.  Future  researchers  may  extend  the
resent  assessment  for  a  more  comprehensive  understand-
ng  of  risk-taking  capabilities  and  risk-taking  behavior.  Last
ut  not  least,  the  present  study  examines  ﬁrms  in  the  elec-
ronics  sector  in  Taiwan  and  does  not  include  ﬁrms  from2 https://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/information/press/press-2015/
916-42312 (in Japanese).
3 http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20151120001057-
60202 (in Traditional Chinese).
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hould  be  extended  to  other  sectors  in  other  economies  for
omparative  studies  to  validate  the  explanatory  power  of
he  current  ﬁndings.
eferences
ndretta, M., 2014. Some considerations on the deﬁnition of risk
based on concepts of systems theory and probability. Risk Anal.
34 (7), 1184--1195.
aird, I.S., Thomas, H., 1985. Toward a contingency model of strate-
gic risk taking. Acad. Manage. Rev. 10 (2), 230--243.
en-Oz, C., Greve, H.R., 2012. Short-and long-term per-
formance feedback and absorptive capacity. J. Manag.,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206312466148.
owman, E.H., 1980. A risk/return paradox for strategic manage-
ment. Sloan Manag. Rev. 21, 17--31.
romiley, P., 1991. Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking
and performance. Acad. Manag. J. 34 (1), 37--59.
hatterjee, A., Hambrick, D.C., 2011. Executive personality, capa-
bility cues, and risk taking how narcissistic CEOs react to their
successes and stumbles. Adm. Sci. Q. 56 (2), 202--237.
hattopadhyay, P., Glick, W.H., Huber, G.P., 2001. Organizational
actions in response to threats and opportunities. Acad. Manag.
J. 44 (5), 937--955.
heng, J.L., Kesner, I.F., 1997. Organizational slack and response to
environmental shifts: the impact of resource allocation patterns.
J. Manag. 23 (1), 1--18.
heng, S., 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate perfor-
mance. J. Financ. Econ. 87 (1), 157--176.
hou, C., Yang, K.P., 2011. The interaction effect of strategic
orientations on new product performance in the high-tech indus-
try: a nonlinear model. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 78 (1),
63--74.
hung, H.M., 2006. Managerial ties, control and deregulation: an
investigation of business groups entering the deregulated bank-
ing industry in Taiwan. Asia Paciﬁc J. Manag. 23 (4), 505--520.
ohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new per-
spective on learning and innovation. Adm. Sci. Q. 35, 128--152.
yert, R.M., March, J.G., 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
Prentice-Hall, NJ.
’Aveni, R.A., 1989. The aftermath of organizational decline: a lon-
gitudinal study of the strategic and managerial characteristics
of declining ﬁrms. Acad. Manag. J. 32 (3), 577--605.
alton, D.R., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand, A.E., 1999. Number of direc-
tors and ﬁnancial performance: a meta-analysis. Acad. Manag.
J. 42 (6), 674--686.
utton, J.E., Jackson, S.E., 1987. Categorizing strategic issues: links
to organizational action. Acad. Manag. Rev. 12 (1), 76--90.
iegenbaum, A., Thomas, H., 1988. Attitudes toward risk and the
risk-return paradox: prospect theory explanations. Acad. Manag.
J. 31 (1), 85--106.
iegenbaum, A., Hart, S., Schendel, D., 1996. Strategic reference
point theory. Strateg. Manag. J. 17 (3), 219--235.
ombrun, C.J., Ginsberg, A., 1990. Shifting gears: enabling change
in corporate aggressiveness. Strateg. Manag. J. 11 (4), 297--308.
eppert, M., Dörrenbächer, C., Gammelgaard, J., Taplin, I., 2013.
Managerial risk-taking in international acquisitions in the Brew-
ery industry: institutional and ownership inﬂuences compared.
Br. J. Manag. 24 (3), 316--332.
ulati, R., 1995. Social structure and alliance formation pattern: a
longitudinal analysis. Adm. Sci. Q. 40, 619--652.
ulati, R., 1999. Network location and learning: the inﬂuence of
network of network resources and ﬁrm capabilities on alliance
formation. Strateg. Manag. J. 20, 397--420.
ambrick, D.C., D’Aveni, R.A., 1988. Large corporate failures as
downward spirals. Adm. Sci. Q. 33 (1), 1--23.
SH.-F.  Tsai,  C.-J.  Luan
olzmann, R., Jørgensen, S., 2001. Social risk management: a new
conceptual framework for social protection, and beyond. Int.
Tax Public Financ. 8 (4), 529--556.
u, S., Blettner, D., Bettis, R.A., 2011. Adaptive aspirations:
performance consequences of risk preferences at extremes
and alternative reference groups. Strateg. Manag. J. 32 (13),
1426--1436.
yer, D.N., Miller, K.D., 2008. Performance feedback, slack, and the
timing of acquisitions. Acad. Manag. J. 51 (4), 808--822.
ahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica 47 (2), 263--291.
aufmann, C., Weber, M., Haisley, E., 2013. The role of experi-
ence sampling and graphical displays on one’s investment risk
appetite. Manag. Sci. 59 (2), 323--340.
iymaz, H., 2015. A performance evaluation of Chinese mutual
funds. Int. J. Emerg. Mark. 10 (4).
raiczy, N.D., Hack, A., Kellermanns, F.W., 2015. What makes a
family ﬁrm innovative? CEO risk-taking propensity and the orga-
nizational context of family ﬁrms. J. Prod. Innov. Manag. 32 (3),
334--348.
ane, P.J., Lubatkin, M., 1998. Relative absorptive capacity and
interorganizational learning. Strateg. Manag. J. 19, 461--477.
ee, C., Lee, K., Pennings, J.M., 2001. Internal capabilities, exter-
nal networks, and performance: a study on technology-based
ventures. Strateg. Manag. J. 22, 615--640.
owrance, W.W.,  1976. Of Acceptable Risk.
uan, C.J., Tang, M.J., 2007. Where is independent director efﬁ-
cacy? Corpor. Govern.: Int. Rev. 15 (4), 636--643.
arch, J.G., Shapira, Z., 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and
risk taking. Manag. Sci. 33, 1404--1418.
eschi, P.X., Métais, E., 2015. Too big to learn: the effects of major
acquisition failures on subsequent acquisition divestment. Br. J.
Manag.
iller, R., Lessard, D.R., 2000. The Strategic Management of Large
Engineering Projects: Shaping Institutions, Risks, and Gover-
nance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
one, M.A., Mckinley, W.,  Barker III, V.L., 1998. Organizational
decline and innovation: a contingency framework. Acad. Manag.
Rev. 23 (1), 115--132.
ontgomery, C.A., Wernerfelt, B., 1988. Diversiﬁcation. Ricardian
rents, and Tobin’s q. Rand J. Econ. 19, 623--632.
ohria, N., Gulati, R., 1996. Is slack good or bad for innovation?
Acad. Manag. J. 39 (5), 1245--1264.
casio, W., 1995. The enactment of economic diversity: a reconcil-
iation of theories of failure-induced change and threat-rigidity.
In: Cummings, L.L., Staw, B.M. (Eds.), Research in Organiza-
tional Behavior, vol. 17. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, pp. 287--
331.
almer, T.B., Danforth, G.M., Clark, S.M., 1995. Strategic responses
to poor performance in the health care industry: a test of
competing predictions. Acad. Manag. J., 125--129 (Best papers
proceedings).
ark, Y.C., 1990. Development lessons from Asia: the role of gov-
ernment in South Korea and Taiwan. Am. Econ. Rev., 118--121.
euer, J.J., Leiblein, M.J., 2000. Downside risk implications of
multinationality and international joint ventures. Acad. Manag.
J. 43, 203--214.
umelt, R.P., 1984. Toward a strategic theory of the ﬁrm. In: Lamb,
B. (Ed.), Competitive Strategic Management. Prentice-Hall, NJ,
pp. 556--570.
himizu, K., 2007. Prospect theory, behavioral theory, and the
threat-rigidity thesis: combinative effects on organizational
decisions to divest formerly acquired units. Acad. Manag. J. 50
(6), 1495--1514.hoham, A., Fiegenbaum, A., 2002. Competitive determinants of
organizational risk-taking attitude: the role of strategic refer-
ence points. Manag. Decis. 40 (2), 127--141.
TT
V
W
W
W
133--153.What  makes  ﬁrms  embrace  risks?  
Simmonds, P.G., 1990. The combined diversiﬁcation breadth and
mode dimensions and the performance of large diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Strateg. Manag. J. 11 (5), 399--410.
Singh, J.V., 1986. Performance, slack, and risk taking in organiza-
tional decision making. Acad. Manag. J. 29 (3), 562--585.
Spithoven, A., Teirlinck, P., 2015. Internal capabilities, network
resources and appropriation mechanisms as determinants of R&D
outsourcing. Res. Policy 44 (3), 711--725.
Stam, W.,  Elfring, T., 2008. Entrepreneurial orientation and new
venture performance: the moderating role of intra- and extra-
industry social capital. Acad. Manag. J. 51 (1), 97--111.
Staw, B.M., Sandelands, L.E., Dutton, J.E., 1981. Threat rigidity
effects in organizational behavior: a multilevel analysis. Adm.
Sci. Q. 26 (4), 501--524.
Tan, J., Peng, M.W., 2003. Organizational slack and ﬁrm per-
formance during economic transitions: two studies from an
emerging economy. Strateg. Manag. J. 24, 1249--1263.
Triana, M.D.C., Miller, T.L., Trzebiatowski, T.M., 2013. The
double-edged nature of board gender diversity: diversity, ﬁrm
performance, and the power of women directors as predictors
of strategic change. Org. Sci. 25 (2), 609--632.
Tsai, W., 2001. Knowledge transfer in intra-organizational networks:
effects of network position and absorptive capacity on
W231
business unit innovation and performance. Acad. Manag. J. 44
(5), 996--1004.
uli, K.R., Bharadwaj, S.G., Kohli, A.K., 2010. Ties that bind: the
impact of multiple types of ties with a customer on sales growth
and sales volatility. J. Mark. Res. 47 (1), 36--50.
versky, A., Kahneman, D., 1981. The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211, 453--458.
oss, G.B., Sirdeshmukh, D., Voss, Z.G., 2008. The effects of slack
resources and environmental threat on product exploration and
exploitation. Acad. Manag. J. 51 (1), 147--164.
ernerfelt, B., 1984. A resources-based view of the ﬁrm. Strateg.
Manag. J. 5 (2), 171--180.
ilson, R.T., Amine, L.S., 2009. Resource endowments, market posi-
tioning, and competition in transitional economies: global and
local advertising agencies in Hungary. Int. Mark. Rev. 26 (1),
62--89.
iseman, R.M., Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1998. A behavioral agency
model of managerial risk taking. Acad. Manag. Rev. 23 (1),iseman, R.M., Bromiley, P., 1996. Toward a model of risk in declin-
ing organizations: an empirical examination of risk, performance
and decline. Org. Sci. 7 (5), 524--543.
